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One of the most notable outcomes of the late 196 Os international
movement for participatory democracy has been the increased demand
for expanded worker rights in decision making, both on the shopfloor
and in the economy as a whole. Whether workplace reforms have meant
co-optation or increased worker control has been hotly debated;
equally controversial has been the question of the survival of work-
place reforms in light of the growing economic crisisfacing all western
industrialized nations. This paper explores the emergence and develop-
ments in industrial and economic democracy from an international
perspective, focusing primarily on Western Europe and the United
States. Similarities and dissimilarities between alternative forms of
worker participation are discussed, and conclusions are drawn which
view these new institutional arrangements for participation within
the context of the wider issue of representation in society.
The international movement for participatory democracy was
most evident in the latter part of the sixties. Public attention most
often focused on community action groups, student power advocates,
racial .liberation groups, anti-war demonstrators, and the revival of the
women's movement. All of these groups had in common their struggle
against authority structures which had remained impervious to their
needs for representation and participation. As a whole, these groups
created such a widespread challenge to authority that the very legiti-
macy of key institutions within industrial nations was called into
question (Deutsch, 1979a).
Far less attention was directed to the mounting dissatisfaction of
workers with the structure ofwork life. Yet, in the period of heightened
awareness about the rights of political and social participation, the
.demand for workplace reform began to be articulated. There was a
growing perception of the contradiction between the rights guaranteed
to individuals as citizens and the denial of democratic structures within
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the workplace. This disjuncture between work and non-work consti-
tutional rights created substantial strains during the sixties, and resulted
in moves toward greater economic participation.
The various types of workers' participation are as diverse as the
actors involved. Labor, management, national governments, as well
as academic researchers and political activists, have all developed
strategies for introducing workplace reforms. Often from divergent
perspectives, they have set about the task of constructing plans to meet
their intended goals. Whereas there have been international cooperative
projects, each country has had to design workplace changes within
their own unique social, political, and economic context. That the
form workers' participation takes is so directly influenced by the
particular history and conditions within a country makes it difficult
. to provide an overarching framework for a general discussion of
workers' participation without leaving bare the specific, intra-country
characteristics which give substance and meaning to its implementa-
tion.
What follows is an attempt to provide an overview of the major
types of workers' participation, with an emphasis on both elaborating
the similarities and dissimilarities between countries and analyzing the
impact of such forms of participation. The main focus of this paper
is to evaluate the extent to which these various forms of participation
result in a transformation of the existing power relationship between
labor and management, i.e., a decrease in managerial prerogatives with
an increase in the decision-making power of labor within the work-
place as well as the economy as a whole.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
WORKERS' PARTICIPATION
The decade of the seventies has been viewed as a turning point in
the area of workers' participation. Whereas the issues of participation
and control have been an integral part of the workers' movements for
a long time (Ramsey, 1977), they came to dominate industrial relations
in the early seventies. Perhaps most notable has been the move toward
greater industrial democracy by virtually. every Western European
country. This movement, however, claims an even broader following,
extending through most of the industrialized as well as developing
countries in the world (Deutsch, 1979b; Espinosa and Zimbalist, 1978;
Mills, 1978; E. Stephens, 1980; Triska and Gati, 1981).
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Throughout Western Europe, as well as in North America, tradi-
tional forms of industrial democracy have been expanded and further
complemented by a variety of new channels for participation. Govern-
ment commissions have been set up to look into the problems and
possibilities of workers' participation-for example, the tripartite
Bullock Commission in Great Britain, the Biedenkopf Commission in
West Germany, and the Sudreau Commission of France (Jain, 1980;
Walker, 1977). The International Labour Organization has devoted a
significant amount of energy to this subject, holding symposia and
collecting infor~ation on developments in individual countries (ILO,
1979, 1981; Jam, 1980). The European Economic Community has
called for increased workers' participation at all levels of the enter-
prise (E~C, ~977, 1980) ..rhe first worldwide conference on the quality
of working life was held in New York in 1972, and today most Western
European countries allocate monies for research directly related to the
humanization of work (Davis, 1975; Wilson, 1979). The West German
"Humanization of Work Act" (1974) is a good example of this commit-
ment to workplace issues. In 1974, the government set up a $110
million fund for research to improve the quality of working life. The
Norwegian Work Research Institutes, the pioneers in the field of
democratizing the workplace, began their studies and experiments
in 1961. Early on they were joined by and have ·collaborated with the
Tavistock Institute in London. Work research institutes are now
familiar organizations and can be found in such countries as Denmark
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Davis, 1975; Gustavsen
and Hunnius, 1981).
A mention of the parallel developments within the academic
community complete this picture of the widespread attention now
centered on workers' participation. Researchers, sometimes in associa-
tion with national or international research institutes and sometimes
within their own academic institutions, have been equally drawn into
t~e field. Some have focused on the theoretical questions of participa-
non (Abrahamsson and Brostrom, 1980; Pateman, 1970), while others
have been involved in action-research within democratizing enterprises
(Whyte, 1980). There have been major international comparative
studies bringing together researchers from a number of countries as
well as single country case studies (Industrial Democracy in Europe,
1980, 1981). In all, there has been a steady growth of attention
devoted to the multiple aspects of workers' participation.
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The Significance of Terminology ,
.Any discussion on workplace democracy becomes quickly con-
fusing without an attempt to sort out competing terms in the field.
Such words as workers' participation, industrial democracy, work-
place democracy, work reform, humanization of work, and quality of
working life are often used interchangeably to denote new forms of
work organization and work relationships. Particular terms, such as
workers' control, self-management, and workers' ownership have
typically been used to describe even greater steps toward structural
transformation of the workplace and its hierarchical relationships.
The use of so many different concepts is a reflection of just how
widespread this movement has been. Both the diversity of actors
involved-political, economic, and academic-as well as the sheer
number of forms of participation inevitably causes a proliferation of
overlapping terms. There are attempts now, such as in Norway, to
organize and integrate these different approaches (Cordova, 1982).
Not all of the confusion in terminology is merely semantic. A
preference for one term over another can also signify what is an under-
lying substantive difference. For example, in the United States the
terms "workers' participation" and "quality of working life" are more
frequently used than the Western European variant, "industrial democ-
cracy." Industrial democracy has generally meant participation within
the enterprise that involves a change in the power relationship between
labor and management. Specifically, managerial prerogatives in decision
making are reduced with a corresponding increase in influence for
workers. Employees, most often through their trade union associa-
tions, have sought influence over the conditions ·of employment
through political channels. Across Western Europe, labor organizations
have exerted pressure on national governments to broaden the base
of democracy within enterprises. For their part, national governments
have generally been responsive to such demands as evidenced in the
heavy reliance of Western European countries on the legislative ap-
proach to increasing workers' rights. The legislative approach has been
viewed as necessary because of the perceived resistance of manage-
ment to the restructuring of power and authority within the enter-
prise.
Industrial democracy, then, has come to signify the restructuring
of power relations within the enterprise and is associated with political
channels for implementation. The term workers' participation, and to
an even large degree the term quality of working life, have not been so
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closely identified with the issue of the transformation of power rela-
tions between employers and employees. Rather, they have been seen
more often as attempts to improve workers' satisfaction on the job
without tampering with the basic structure of authority. Consequently,
they are profiled as far less political than their Western European
counterpart. This is not to suggest, however, that all forms of participa-
tion in Western Europe are aimed at changes in the power relationship"
any more than it is to assume that all North American forms lack the
potential for a transformation of the workplace. What is instructive
about this contrast in terms is that it does reflect the influence of the
social, political, and economic environment on a definition of work-
place democracy. Thus, the context in which participation is form-
ulated in Western Europe differs significantly from that found, for
example, in the United States. Similarly, there are intra-European
variations in participation which are the product of country-specific
differences.
The section that follows attempts both to recognize these dif-
ferences, as well as to present an overview of the major forms of partici-
pation related to work. Because the major emphasis of this paper is on
participation that effects a changing power relationship, the term
industrial democracy will be used to describe these various forms. In
addition, this section will introduce and explain the more recent
concept of economic democracy.
Participatory Forms
There are a number of ways to organize a presentation of the
different forms of industrial democracy. Although classification
schemes vary in design and their emphases, there is also a good deal of
uniformity among them (Cordova, 1982; Jain, 1980; Mills, 1978;
Poole, 1979; Strauss, 1979; Walker, 1977; Windmuller, 1977). The
following classification scheme was constructed to be as inclusive as
possible, and employs six major categories: (1) Collective Bargaining;
(2) Workers' Representation on Boards - Codetermination; (3) Joint
Consultation and Information - Works Councils; (4) Humanization of
Work; (5) Self-Management; and, (6) Economic Democracy.
1. Collective Bargaining. Collective bargaining is perhaps the most
common form of industrial democracy. For the United States, Great
Britain, Australia, and Canada, it has been seen as the major vehicle for
increasing the influence of workers (Poole, 1979), and it is in place in
some form or another in most countries. The basic premise of collective
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bargaining is that of equal parties coming together to negotiate the
terms of employment. It is conceived of as "conflictual" or adversarial
participation. As formal representatives of workers, trade unions act as
a countervailing force to managerial definitions of the workplace.
Based on the idea that workers have rights directly stemming from
their contribution of labor, trade unions have argued for workers'
rights to negotiate on a whole range of issues. It has sometimes been
argued that collective bargaining stands outside the common definition
of industrial democracy in that it has been most often associated with
the economic conditions of employment rather than the non-economic
issues of the workplace. But the underlying goal of collective bargaining
has always been an increase in the rights of workers.
Historically, the emphasis has been on increasing the rights of
workers to participate in the economic benefits accruing to the enter-
prise, but more recently, there has been a steady growth of attention
devoted to the more non-economic issues of participation within enter-
prises. What have been considered the legitimate areas for collective
bargaining have expanded, encompassing a wide range of areas that
heretofore were considered solely the domain of management. For
example, there have been collective agreements on data and technology
(Norway, Denmark), job security (Great Britain, United States), and
the length of the work cycle ' (West Germany). Italy has lagged behind
the other European nations in industrial democracy, but what gains
it has made have come from collective agreements which have covered
both economic and non-economic factors. Sweden, on the other side
of the continuum of success in pushing industrial democracy, has
lookedto 'collective bargaining" aswell to finalize its widely publicized
framework law on the Joint Regulation of Working Life (MBL).
This act, passed in 1976, gave unions the right to negotiate collec-
tive agreements on all aspects of supervision and management that had
formerly been the sole right of management (Albrecht, 1980, 1981;
Lind, 1978; Martin, 1976, 1977). The law abolishes the old paragraph
32 of the Swedish Employers' Confederation statutes that had granted
these managerial prerogatives in exchange for the right of workers
to organize and negotiate on pay and employment conditions. In this
sense, the act represents a move in the direction of broadening the base
of collective bargaining to encompass more and more non-economic
factors in the workplace.
Collective bargaining, then, has always played a major role in
increasing the influence of workers. In the seventies and eighties it has
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become an instrument for increased industrial democracy. As Walker
(1977) summarizes it,
While collective bargaining is not universally regarded as a form ~f
worker's participation in management, it cannot be denied that in the
absence of collective bargaining, management would make decisions
unilaterally. Each widening of the range of issues subject to collective
bargaining has been contested by management as an invasion of mana-
gerial functions, and the historical trend has clearly been toward
greater and greater penetration of areas of decision which would
otherwise be taken unilaterally by management (3).
The issue of collective bargaining provides a good starting point
for a discussion of industrial democracy. Whereas its emphasis has
primarily been the negotiation of economic issues between labor and
management, it can also serve as a basis for expanding worker influence.
In fact, collective bargaining may potentially expand the power of
labor during a period of economic crisis. In the United States for
example, particularly in the heavy industries, management has increas-
ingly s.ought economic concessions from labor through wage cutbacks,
reductions in standard of living clauses, and benefit packages. Labor,
in turn, has become concerned with securing non-economic exchanges
for such concessions. Perhaps the most visible example of this was the
appointment of the president of the autoworkers to the Board of the
Chrys!er Corporation. But there are equally important efforts by labor
to gaIn expanded power. by exchanging economic benefits for such
things as increased control over worker pension funds, investment
decisions, open company books, and assurances of job security. To give
an overly optimistic view of labor's strength to secure such exchanges
would fail to recognize present managerial efforts to weaken organized
labor in a period of heavy unemployment (Deutsch and Albrecht,
1983). The point is, however, that collective bargaining does offer a
structure in which labor can actively seek to restrict economic .cutbacks
and push for greater non-economic influence over the workplace.
2. Workers' Representation on Boards - Codetermination. This
form of industrial democracy involves seating voting representatives of
labor on the governing bodies of enterprises. As such, it is viewed as a
more decentralized form of bargaining between labor and management
at. the level ?f .the firm rather than the more industry-wide or economy-
wide : negotianons of traditional collective bargaining (Windmuller,
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1977). It is also conceived of as a form of "cooperative" participation
between labor and management in pursuit of a common goal, the
economic success of the enterprise (Poole, 1979). The exact form that
codetermination takes within a country is dependent on the proportion
of labor representatives designated to sit on the corporate boards, the
manner in which the scheme is introduced, and the perceived goal of
such labor representation.
Codeterrnination is a post-World War II phenomenon, with the
first form being introduced into the West German coal, iron and steel
industries in 1947 and later made into law in 1951 (Espinosa and Zim-
balist, 1978). The' law calls for parity labor representation in all such
industries with more than 1,000 employees. In 1952, the Works Consti-
tution Act extended codetermination to include industries throughout
West Germany. This time, the representation for workers amounted to
one-third of the supervisory boards of enterprises. In the Codetermina-
tion Act of 1976, the amount of representatives was increased to
parity, with some qualifications, in all large enterprises employing
more than 2,000 workers (Monissen, 1978).
Although codetermination has been most closely associated with
West German industrial relations, it is now found in many other coun-
tries as well. Most of the legislation enacting some form of codetermina-
tion came about in the early seventies. For example, Norway, which
had previously opted for other forms of industrial democracy more
directed toward shopfloor participation, enacted a Codeterrnination
Law in 1971 calling for one-third labor representation on corporate
boards. Sweden instituted a trial act on Employee Representation on
Boards in 1973; this law applies to enterprises with 25 or more..em-
ployees and gives unions the right to name two representatives to the
board of directors. Denmark followed in 1973-74 with a similar act
calling for two labor representatives. France, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands have some variation of board representation with labor
input as well (Pejovich, 1978).
With very few exceptions, codetermination has been introduced
through the legislative process. Ireland, however, stands in contrast to
this process, and the decision on admitting labor representatives on the
governing boards is voluntary and left up to each individual firm
(Pejovich, 1978). For Great Britain, a decision on codeterrnination
has been delayed. Over strong managerial opposition to codetermina-
tion, the Bullock Report came out in favor of moving in that direc-
tion, but action has yet to be taken.
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Evaluating the performance of codetermination as an effective
form of participation is a more difficult job. On the one hand, having
labor representatives on c~mpany boards has not resulted in any major
changes in the decision-making policies of enterprises. Employee
representatives, primarily in the minority, have not exerted an over-
riding influence on these boards. Because of this, trades unions have
been less than enthusiastic to this form of participation, and, in fact,
have seen its potential to undermine their primary role of collective
bargaining. On the other hand, there are specific instances when such
board representation has complemented the role of collective bar-
gaining and expanded the' influence that workers have on major deci-
sions within the enterprise. For example, labor was able to guarantee
job security for its West German employees when Volkswagen Com-
pany wanted to invest in automobile plants in the United States. As
Windmuller (1977) argues:
Thus, labor used its legally mandated POSItions on the company's
highest policy-making body to extract concessions that management
might well have rejected or even refused to discuss as bargainable items
if the union had demanded them in regular collective bargaining ne-
gotiations. By taking full advantage of its insider position, labor demon-
strated that control of a block of employee representatives in the board
could be converted into de facto extension of the structure and subject
matter of collective bargaining (23).
It is interesting to note that this decision was made prior to the exten-
sion of the proportion of labor representatives in West Germany, which
would only increase the significance of this argument.
. The new West German Codeterrnination Act, as well as the
Swedish decision in 1976 to make its earlier trial act a permanent one,
point to the continuing support given to this form of industrial democ-
racy. However, there is a good deal of difference between West German
and Scandinavian approaches to board representation. Whereas West
German legislation has been aimed at extending the proportion of
board representative to increase the balance of power within the
supervisory boards, Scandinavian laws on codetermination have settled
for minority representation. For example, the Swedish approach to
industrial democracy has never emphasized board representation
as a way to increase the influence of workers, but has involved as an
alternative path, discussed above as the Joint Regulation of Working
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Life Act (MBL). What makes it confusing in the international literature
is that the Swedish and German words are remarkably similar, Med-
bestammande and Mitbestimmung. However, the approaches are
dissimilar. German codetermination implies labor representation on
company boards; in Sweden, such representation is covered under a
separate act originating in 1973 and finalized in 1976. Sweden's 1976
"codetermination" act is a separate act which gives labor the right to
negotiate with management "codetermination agreements" in those
areas of management and supervision formerly closed to them. The
Swedish reliance on this particular form of industrial democracy to
increase employee participation in decision making, in turn, explains
their approach to board representation. While West Germany has moved
toward greater labor representation, Sweden has opted for minority
representation (only two members). For Sweden, board representa-
tion has been legislated not for the purpose of influence over decision
making but for the primary purpose of increasing information available
to labor about the major decisions of the corporation.
3. Joint Consultation and Information - Works Councils. Works
Councils have been around since the late nineteenth century and are
found in some form in all Western European countries. They have
witnessed periods of support, relative disuse, and now a renewed
interest. The typical format of works councils is one of a joint labor-
management committee at the enterprise level. The overall goal of
works councils has been to increase harmonious relationships between
labor and management, discussing such issues as productivity, security
of employment, and working conditions. The role of workers' repre-
sentatives in these bodies has been one of consultation rather than
influence since management still retains the right to make the final
decision after collaboration. For that reason, often they have been
regarded as weak arrangements for true worker participation, some-
times referred to as "phony participation" (Strauss, 1979). However,
in the latter part of the seventies, their role began to change. In a num-
ber of different countries, there is a noticeable move away from the
concept of harmonious relationships to a more adversarial position.
Their rights have been expanded and they are playing a larger and larger
role in protecting the interests of workers within the enterprise. For
example, in the Netherlands, which now has over 3,500 works coun-
cils, new rights to information have been legislated. This is equally
true of Belgium. The expanded role of works councils has been
mandated by law in Denmark in 1980, as well as Austria in its 1974
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Collective Labour Relations Act. In West Germany, where works
councils are made up of only employee representatives, they have
increased decision-making rights on such issues as the setting of wage
rates above the minimum determined by collective bargaining. Italian
works councils have moved from joint labor-management representa-
tion to sole representation by employees. And, in the new socialist
government of France, works councils are given increased rights over a
variety of important issues such as "wages, employment, training, work
organization and hours of work" (Cordova, 1982; see also, Poole, 1979;
Strauss, 1979; Walker, 1977).
To some, this revitalization of works councils in Western Europe
with their new decision-making rights is seen as the "most dramatic
change that has recently taken place in the area of participation"
(Cordova, 1982:129). Dramatic, not only because of the works councils
themselves, but because it represents a move in the direction of increas-
ing industrial democracy through channels other than board represen-
tation.
Far less dramatic are developments in the United States in what is
referred to as "quality control circles" (Konz, 1981). Originally de-
signed in the 1950s by American managers and consultants to help the
Japanese improve quality and production within their firms, the con-
cept has reemerged in America because of the very success of these
firms. The idea behind these quality control circles is that the goals of
quality and production are mutually beneficial to both workers and
management, and therefore, both groups should come together in a
cooperative atmosphere to seek ways to improving and increasing
.qualiry production. Essentially these are voluntary groups of workers
with management leadership. They meet to discuss and exchanse ideas
and information about ways to increase efficiency, producti~n, and
quality-improvements, alternative methods, innovations, and any
work-related problems from working conditions to worker relations
that may be detracting from the productivity of the firm. The increas-
ing introduction of these quality control circles has generated war-
ranted concern on the part of American labor unions. They have been
seen as a way to make unions appear unnecessary, to combat union
organizing, and in general, to undermine the authority of unions within
the plant (Deutsch and Albrecht, 1983). Thus, unlike the expanded
powers delegated to Western European works councils, quality control
circles may well prove to be a mechanism for further control on the
part of the management. They share common characteristics with
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those humanization of work projects that have been management
initiated and directed-a subject to be discussed in the following sec-
tion.
4. Humanization of Work. This form of participation has been
primarily concerned with the improvement of working conditions at
the shopfloor level. Specifically, it covers new forms of work organiza-
tion as well as work environment reform (Barbash, 1980; Sheppard,
1980; Wilson, 1979). It is distinctive from the previous three categories
in that it is more likely to be a form of direct, face-to-face participa-
tion, than indirect or representative participation.
The movement to reform the workplace at the shopfloor began
in earnest in the 1960s. There was increasing concern expressed by
governments, labor, and management about the problems at the work-
place: high turnover rates, increased absenteeism, and lower than
expected production. Some attributed the problem to the fact that the
workplace had not changed over time, but that workers had changed.
They were coming into the workplace with higher educational attain-
ment, and a corresponding set of attitudes about work and authority
that were at odds with the reality of worklife. Instead of concentrat-
ing on the characteristics of a new breed of workers, others saw the
problem as the structure of work itself, e.g., a division of labor that
was so detailed that a worker felt alienated from the entire labor
process, physiological as well as psychological hazards on the job, and
the rapid introduction of new technology into the workplace. A 1972
HEW commissioned study, Work in America, began its summary report
by noting that "significant numbers of American workers are dissatis-
fied with the quality .of their working lives. rxn, repetitive, seemingly
meaningless tasks, offering little challenge or autonomy, are causing
discontent among workers at all occupational levels" (HEW, 1972:xv).
Workplace reform was seen as the possible solution to these grow-
ing problems. The quality of working life could be improved by re-
designing jobs-for example, replacing the assembly line with semi-
autonomous work groups, allowing job rotation, and instituting flexi-
ble work schedules. Job enrichment programs, aimed at fusing together
tasks that had formally been separated, could provide a more meaning-
ful work situation. And, giving workers more discretionary power over
how they carried out their work on a day-to-day basis could increase
their sense of autonomy and improve their overall job satisfaction.
For the most part, humanization of work projects have been
introduced on a voluntary basis. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
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these experiments were predominantly initiated by management. The
goal was a clear one: improve working conditions in order to decrease
labor turnover and absenteeism and increase productivity. Because of
this, trade unions have been skeptical about this form of participation.
They have seen it as co-optive in that it is designed to increase workers'
satisfaction with their everyday surroundings while leaving intact the
authority structure of the enterprise. In fact, in some cases, programs
have been initiated to ward off potential unionization. Both American
as well as European trade unions, then, were less than enthusiastic
at the first developments in the reform of the workplace. It has only
been since the late 1970s and the more widespread introduction of
joint labor-management projects, often referred to as quality of work-
life (QWL) projects, that there is increasing interest shown on the part
of trade unions. There is one critical qualification in this statement,
and that is, trade unions are interested in workplace reform projects
that are specifically joint labor-management projects. In the absence
of unionization and where experiments are introduced solely by man-
agement, their appraisal still remains negative. Where unions and
employees are actively involved in deciding what these changes in the
workplace will be, however, support for such experiments has steadily
grown (Hanlon, 1982).
Closely related to the concept of workplace reform is that of work
environment reform. It is treated separately because the work environ-
ment movement has not only redefined safety and health in the work-
place, but it has also provided a major vehicle for increased democracy
at the workplace (Deutsch, 1981a, 1981b). Particularly in Norway and
Sweden, work environment acts have used comprehensive definitions
of safety and health to apply to all aspects of the workplace. For
exampIe, the Swedish Work Environment Act (1978) stipulates that
"working conditions shall be adapted to the physical and psychological
abilities of human beings." The Norwegian Work Environment Act is
unique in its inclusion of technology, production systems and related
factors (Gustavsen and Hunnius, 1981). Other European countries
have followed in this vein as well. For example, the Netherlands Em-
ployment Conditions Act (1980) deals specifically with worker isola-
tion and the social aspects of the work environment, building on the
substantial body of research on psycho-social aspects of worklife
(Asplund, 1981).
In the United States, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
was passed in 1970, and by the end of that decade, workers' demands
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for a safe and healthy workplace were being consistently articulated.
Under the leadership of Dr. Eula Bingham from 1977-1981, the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) put forth. a great
deal of energy to improve health standards, initiated traimng and
education programs, strengthened the enforcement of he~th and safety
standards, and sought workers' and unions' involvement In the process.
These early moves acted as a catalyst for further demands on the part
of workers in the 1980s to expand their rights to a safe and healthy
workplace. Although the Reagan Administr~tio~ has actively tried to
curtail the past activities of OSHA and redefme its role, the strength of
the health and safety movement may well be able to withstand this
period of retrenchment (Deutsch and Albrecht,. 1983). . .
This expanded definition of the work environment 15 acc?~pam~d
by the recognition that workers should be able to participate m
decisions related to both health and safety as well as issues on the
introduction of new technology. In the Scandinavian work environ-
ment acts, for example, workers are given specific rights to m~e
judgments about the work environment, shu~ting down production
if they determine it necessary. Thus, work envlro.n~ent has become a
rallying point for those interested in democratizing t~e workplace.
It is seen as a way to expand workers' rights. To some, it may be the
most effective channel for industrial democracy.
Work environment reform raises the prospect of deeper penetration
into management rights then either collective bargaining or codeter-
mination, even if its explicit ideology appears less challenging to capital-
ism •. The new grounds -for joint decision making granted under statute
and collective agreements go to such classic management rights as
shutting down operations for health and safety reasons and deter-
mining production processes, materials, and layout. The likelihood
of real joint decision making is also much greater than in collective
bargaining or codetermination where, in practice, the union is typically
reacting to management initiatives. The immediacy of work environ-
ment to the rank and file and the union suggests a more initiating and
aggressive union posture on these issues (Barbash, 1980:194).
5. SelfManagement and Workers' Ownership. Self-mana~em.en.t,
or workers' control, is where the management of the enterprise l~ In
the hands of workers or their representatives. Workers have the fInal
authority in decision making. The Yugoslav system of self-management
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is probably the most well known example of self-management
(Stephen, 1976-77; Vanek, 1971).
Workers' ownership does not necessarily mean worker's self-
management. For example, workers may participate in some form of
of stock ownership within their company, and still not accrue any
effective voting power within that enterprise. Take the United States'
example of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). In these plans
an Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT) is set up which borrows
money from the bank and transfers this money to the corporation. In
return for the loan, the corporation transfers a certain amount of
corporate stock to the trust. Part of the corporate profits each year
goes to the trust for repayment of the loan. Shares are 'released' to
workers equal to the percentage of the loan paid off. These shares can
be cashed in by the workers when they leave the firm. The primary goal
of ESOPs has been to provide tax benefits to management rather than
to increase worker influence through ownership or voting powers.
Repayment of the loan is tax free because it is seen as a pension con-
tribution and is therefore viewed as deferred labor compensation. The
'unreleased' shares are typically not voting stock for the employees, but
rather voting is vested in a trust committee determined by the bank.
Additionally, the amount of stock held within the trust varies according
to the needs of management and may only be a small amount of all the
stockholdings. While workers share in the profits of the company,
without major reforms, the ESOPs will not increase worker power
(Dawson, 1978; Industrial Cooperative Association, 1978; Zwerdling, -
1978).
Producer Cooperatives seem to come closest to workers" owner-
ship also meaning workers' control. Producer cooperatives have been
around for a long time in both Western Europe and the United States.
With the increased economic crisis, there has been a revival of producer
cooperatives in the United States and Great Britain. In an effort to save
their jobs, workers have collectively tried to buyout plants before they
shut down (Strauss, 1979).
In the United States, particularly, there has been an increasing
amount of support for the concept of workers being owners (Russell,
1982). With few exceptions, there has been much less attention devoted
to the concept of workers being managers of the enterprise. Workers'
self-management implies a radical transformation of the structure of
authority and control within the workplace, and as such, has met
heavy resistance. Because it is viewed as no longer a reform measure,
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but rather a new structure of work, it is sometimes omitted in classifi-
cation schemes on industrial democracy.
6. Economic Democracy. The five categories above have dealt
with the concept of industrial democracy, increasing the. control that
workers have over decision making within firms. Economic democracy
deals more with increasing the decision-making powers of workers
in the economy as a whole. Specifically, economic democracy h~s
meant increasing the control workers have over capital and the way it
is used within society (Carnoy and Shearer, 1980). It is important to
note that economic democracy does not imply participation in the
distribution of capital, such as profit-sharing schemes which distribute
a certain percentage of the company profits to individual work~rs,
but rather implies participation in decision-making power stemmmg
from the ownership of capital. Thus, economic democracy has come to
mean the transfer of decision-making rights in the economy from the
few to the many. In this sense, it has been seen as the third stage ~n
the democratization of society: political, social, and now economIC
democracy. . .
Economic democracy is a relatively new approach to Increasmg
worker participation. Perhaps the most well-known atte.mpt has been
the Swedish wage-earner investment funds proposal which has called
for the transfer of a certain percentage of company profits into shares
to be collectively owned and controlled by labor and its representatives
(Albrecht and Deutsch, 1983; Asard, 1980; Hancock, 19~1; Hoglund,
1978. Meidner, 1978, 1981). This proposal has been hIghly contro-
versial since it was originally introduced by the Swedish Confederation
of Trade Unions (LO) in"1996. Since that time it has undergone re-
visions, and the history of its development is a reflection of both
changes in the political as well as economic sit~ation within Sweden.
What has been retained throughout, however, 1S the essence of the
conflict: collective share ownership by labor. With the return of the
Social Democratic Party to power, the implementation of some form
of wage-earner investment funds is .exp~cted, and th~ ~ebate over
these funds continues to be of major importance within Sweden.
In the United States, the labor movement has become increasingly
interested in determining how the vast amount of capital (600 billion
dollars, increasing 11% yearly) in employee pension funds is be~g
invested (Rifkin and Barber, 1978; Lowry, 1982). The A~L-CIO ill
1980 took an official stand on labor control over pensIon funds,
calling both for investments that help generate new jobs and help
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strengthen the U.s. economy, as well as the disinvestment in anti-
union u.s. corporations and South African companies (AFL-CIO,
1981a, 1981b). With the noticeable growth in plant closings and run-
away shops in the United States, there is pending legislation in a
number of states to give workers and communities more control over
the investment/disinvestment decisions of companies in their locality
(Deutsch and Albrecht, 1983).
The issue of economic democracy has met large scale resistance
on the part of management and touches at the core of capital owner-
ship. It is the most recent development in the movement for greater
representation of workers in decisions that affect their lives, both at
work and in their larger social environment. It is also being discussed in
a period of economic crisis facing western industrialized countries,
and will be acted out as questions about the survival of such market
economies mount.
The six categories, taken together, demonstrate how widespread
the movement toward greater worker democratization has been since
the early seventies. The above classification has attempted to organize
the field around the similarities between countries and how they have
approached industrial and economic democracy. What is equally
important, however, is the actual variability between countries and the
manner in which they have sought expanded employee rights. Because
of differences in the social, political, and economic environment of
countries, each has a unique vision of just how industrial democracy
should be implemented and faces particular challenges to its intro-
duction. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in the study of industrial and
..economic democracy is in evaluating the import of the myriad of
workplace changes. The central question is whether such changes
maintain and perpetuate existing relationships within the workplace
and the economy as a whole, or whether they transform these rela-
tionships. The thesis of this paper is that the only real forms of indus-
trial and economic democracy are those that result in increased
decision-making power on the part of labor with a corresponding de-
crease in managerial prerogatives and capital ownership. An assessment
of the transformative powers of a single change, however, is a compli-
cated one. For example, what may appear in the short run to be merely
a face-lifting change which only further entrenches capital's power
over labor, may effect long term changes. Reforms in their earliest
inception may over time incorporate expanded rights for labor. For
example, humanization of work projects in the United States have
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typically been seen as a way for management to ~ntroduce changes. in
the workplace which create a better work envIronment,. e~hanc1~g
the conditions of work in order to increase labor productivity while
retaining all decision-making power. Because of this ~otivation,o.rgan-
ized labor has resisted such plans. It is only when projects are designed
which give explicit power to labo~ in th~ form of joint labor-manage-
ment projects that they approach industrial dem.ocracy and a~ceptance
by labor unions. Labor's stand on. such. proJ~cts 1S pred1cate~ on
whether they are introduced in umon firms w1th guar~teed ngh~s
to labor or whether they are implemented under managerial control m
an unorganized workplace. ..
Further, it is often difficult to determine wh1ch changes should
be incorporated into a discussion of industrial democracy. For a long
time the issue of work environment reform stood apart from the
disc~ssion of industrial democracy. But the Scandinavian experience
with work environment legislation has shown how expanded labor
control over the specific issues of health and safety and technology
may prove to be an inroad into even further. changes in. influence.
There is, in Pateman's terms (1970), an educative process m t~e very
act of participating which furthers the detnand and expert1se for
expanded inclusion in decision making. .
Additionally, focusing on isolated changes may ignore the cumu-
lative effect derived from a series of reforms over time. For example,
the Swedish moves toward industrial and economic democracy b~gan
in earnest in the early 1970s with a series of legislative acts, culminat-
ing in the Joint Regulation of Wo~king Life !"-ct which addresses
directly the reduction of past managenal prerogauves at the workplac.e.
In turn Sweden's' move toward economic democracy has been built
on the' foundation of this legislation. Only by looking at this entire
body of legislation and pending proposals is it possible to evaluate
their overall impact. .
The above issues serve only as an illustration of the probes neces-
sary in analyzing the nature of workplace changes and their potential
for labor. There are many more. To fully answer the question of the
transformative nature of workplace changes, it is necessary to have
both an historical understanding of each country's development as well
as knowledge of the contemporary political-economic situation in
which these changes are being implemented. To dismiss all the various
forms of workers' participation as merely structural maintenance
would be as unproductive as it would be to embrace all changes in the
workplace without a critical eye.
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CONCLUSION
The move toward industrial and economic democracy, particular-
ly in Western Europe, has resulted in the restructuring of the work-
place. At all levels of the enterprise workers have sought and gained
greater rights of participation and representation. Managerial pre-
rogatives in decision making have been narrowed with a corresponding
expansion of rights guaranteed to workers. Collective bargaining has
been used to negotiate not only the economic conditions of employ-
ment but the non-economic aspects of work as well. West German
codetermination, labor representation on the governing boards of
companies, has expanded to encompass more and more countries.
Joint consultation bodies, such as works councils, have enjoyed a
revival in many countries and is sometimes seen as the best channel
for greater industrial democracy. Humanization projects abound in
both Western Europe and North America. Whereas self-management
has occupied a less prominent role in the movement, examples of
forms of self-determination have also multiplied. Finally, the early
examples of economic democracy indicate the direction of further
demands for greater workers' representation within our economic
institutions. As a whole, they represent a shift in emphasis from ques-
tions involving the distribution of economic resources to questions
involving the distribution of power. To one observer (J. Stephens,
1980), this development represents a move away from the consump-
tion politics of the modern welfare state to political concern with
the distribution of control within advanced industrial societies. Giddens
(1973) has. referred to it as a shift from. the .question of"economism"
to one of "control."
For the most .part, this movement for industrial and economic
democracy began during a period of eco~omic growth. That it is
now being played out in the context of an international economic
crisis, has certainly influenced its design and implementation. What
is noteworthy, however, is the fact that the issue of participation
has not been abandoned. In fact, both industrial and economic democ-
racy have been interpreted as possible solutions to these growing
problems. For example, as collective agreements over increased eco-
nomic benefits, and in some cases merely maintaining benefits already
established, have become more difficult, trade unions have moved
toward a negotiating plan which seeks increased decision-making
power within the enterprise in return for lost economic benefits (e.g.,
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in the United States, board representation and security of employment
guarantees). As workers bear the cost of past management investment
decisions, they have increasingly fought to have some control over
future capital decisions. These inroads into the democratization of the
economy have opened up new channels of influence, the impact of
which will be felt in the years to come.
FOOTNOTES
1. I want to thank Steven Deutsch and Thomas Walls for helpful comments
and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper prepared for the Western
European Studies Conference on Representation and the State, Stanford,
1982. I would also like to thank the Swedish Center for Workinglife (ALC)
for their support and assistance, Summer 1982.
2. The length of the work cycle is a broad term which includes such issues as the
length of the workday, the allocation of breaktimes, and decisions concerning
the duration of shift work cycles.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES OF
THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
T.R. Young
Colorado State University
and
Director) Red Feather Institute
The paper offers a sociological explanation for the underground struc-
tures which arise in societies organized as political democracies. The
case of the United States is used to explore this curious fact. The dis-
junction between democracy in public life and inequality in private life
is resolved by the underground structures of the democratic state. In
brief, as a stratified society becomes more democratic, secret police
are used to destabilize social and collective movements toward equality.
The preferred strategy is to destabilize class enemies abroad and to
draw upon the profits of the global capitalist system in order to sus-
tain legitimacy at home without repression or deception. When this is
not possible, the crisis of capitalism requires the state to go under-
ground to control class enemies at home. Workers, socialists, women
and minority groups come under secret surveillance. Social justice is de-
feated while the appearance ofpopular governance is sustained.
In addition to the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, the Drug Enforcement
Agency' and the Secret Service, the U.S.' federal government has
eighteen other agencies which engage in surreptitious surveillance of
u.S. citizens. To these one must add the secret activities of the urban
police in the largest 300 or so American cities. And many states, led
perhaps by California, also have a secret state police capacity. Con-
temporary theory in American sociology on the state, on the whole
society, in deviance or in urban theory ignore this most interesting
and permanent part of the social order. In her otherwise excellent
analysis, Van fossen (1979) devotes one sentence to the role of secret
police in maintaining the stratification of power in the u.S. Roach,
Gross, and Gursslin don't mention police in their (1969) treatise on
'stratification in the u.s. nor does Merton (1968) mention the under-
ground structures of the state in his essays on Social Structure and
Anomie. One might wonder whether the FBI is rebellious or merely
